to technical matters, such as fire control, the use of metres instead of yards, fire observations, etc.; some time would be required to accustom the British and French artillery to the Italian methods.

After you had made allowance for all these things, he asked how much time remained ? If he could have the artillery for long enough he would, of course, be delighted."

General Gadorna then alluded to the danger of an offensive from the Trentino, which, he pointed out,

" was very great. So long as the snow was on the mountains the Italians were safe from this menace, but after May he was liable to be attacked from two points."

I said that

" the conditions as to the return of the guns by May Mv offer to mi Skt a PPb> to the French guns, but I lend guns for myself had not, up to the present, excluded the a prolonged possibility of allowing British guns to remain offensive a loner ^ m ^ Italian Front."

M. Thomas expressed

<c considerable surprise at this last remark. He said that I talked as though my resources were unlimited. At one and the same time I talked of sending guns both to Russia and to Italy. *How could this be done without altering the whole equilibrium of the position on the Western Front ?"*

I retorted that,

" at the present moment, there

were on the British Front twice as many heavy guns as there